Injustice and the Victim\u27s Voice by Yack, Bernard
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 89 Issue 6 
1991 
Injustice and the Victim's Voice 
Bernard Yack 
University of Michigan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law and Philosophy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bernard Yack, Injustice and the Victim's Voice, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1334 (1991). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol89/iss6/5 
 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
INJUSTICE AND THE VICTIM'S VOICE 
Bernard Yack* 
THE FACES OF INJUSTICE. By Judith Shklar. New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press. 1990. Pp. vii, 144. $19.95. 
Injustice is the most ordinary of our ordinary vices. It is a rare day 
indeed in which we do not suffer, experience, or commit some injus-
tice, large or small. And if we do not personally suffer an injustice 
that day, we can be sure that a friend or acquaintance will tell us about 
the injustice that he or she suffered. For injustice is our favorite topic 
of discussion. No subject figures more prominently in the stories that 
we tell each other. 
If asked what we mean by injustice, we have an obvious answer 
ready to hand: the absence of justice, the failure to receive what we 
believe to be our due. Most moral, legal, and political philosophers 
have accepted this obvious definition of injustice. Accordingly, they 
have devoted almost all of their efforts to identifying the nature and 
sources of justice, convinced that, in doing so, they will satisfactorily 
answer our questions about injustice as well. 
In The Faces of Injustice, Judith Shklar challenges this general be-
lief about the nature and sources of injustice. Her provocative and 
wonderfully original essay argues that philosophy and common sense 
alike generally have failed to give injustice its due. Treating injustice 
as the mere negation of justice, Shklar suggests, obscures "the full, 
complex, and enduring character of injustice as a social phenomenon" 
(p. 9). In particular, it encourages the false and arrogant belief that 
some systematic body of rules and principles can capture the full range 
of actions that inspire reasonable complaints about injustice. More-
over, treating injustice as a mere negation of justice ignores or silences 
a large portion of the complaints made by individuals who think them-
selves victims of injustice. For victims of injustice frequently allege 
slights that cannot be described as mere departures from recognized 
standards and principles. 
Shklar argues that moral, legal, and political philosophers have 
much to learn from the victim's perspective on injustice. Her argu-
ment is not, however, a mere lament about how jurists and philoso-
phers lose sight of real individuals and their suffering in the pursuit of 
* Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan. B.A. 1975, University of 
Toronto; Ph.D. (Government) 1981, Harvard. - Ed. 
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general rules and principles.1 It is, instead, an attempt to make use of 
the victim's special insights to push us toward a more satisfactory the-
ory of injustice, a theory that makes no attempt to hide the limits of 
our cognitive capacities. As such, The Faces of Injustice should be 
most welcome to readers who appreciate the skeptical edge of cur-
rently fashionable modes of legal criticism, but are annoyed by the 
endless and self-congratulatory negativity of those who apply them. 
As in her earlier book, Legalism, 2 Shklar recognizes here that skepti-
cism about the fabled law/politics distinction is the beginning, not the 
conclusion, of a more political understanding of law and injustice. 
Presented originally as the Storrs lectures at Yale University Law 
School, Shklar's essay contains the kind of provocative formulations 
and vivid examples that we expect of good lectures. Moreover, Sh-
klar's skillful use of art and literature to advance her arguments gives 
the book a liveliness rarely found in legal and philosophical scholar-
ship. But her essay also has the overly compressed, impatient, and 
allusive style that often emerges in lectures that attempt to cram a 
large subject into a relatively short period of time. Hence, The Faces 
of Injustice may seem to some readers to be more a series of provoca-
tive and disconnected suggestions than a series of fully developed ar-
guments. I try to show in this essay that this impression is illusory. 
Shklar's book makes a number of important and highly original argu-
ments about the nature of injustice and the political institutions we 
construct to deal with it. Readers may have to expend considerable 
effort to recognize all of these arguments, but such effort will be richly 
rewarded - if not with all the answers they might like, then with a set 
of thought-provoking questions they will find nowhere else. 
I. PASSIVE INJUSTICE AND THE "NORMAL MODEL" OF JUSTICE 
The familiar understanding of injustice as the absence or negation 
of justice follows directly from what Shklar calls the "normal model" 
of justice. The normal model presents a picture of justice that is 
equally at home in common opinion and philosophic scholarship. It 
portrays justice as a body of rules and basic principles governing the 
distribution of benefits and burdens within a community, and it de-
mands the establishment of effective and impartial institutions to guar-
antee the enforcement of these basic rules and principles. Injustice, 
according to the normal model, occurs whenever we depart from any 
of these norms (p. 17). 
What aspects of injustice do we miss when we treat it as the depar-
ture from the basic norms of justice? Most significantly, we ignore or 
misrepresent our complaints about what Shklar, building upon a dis-
1. Such as we find in E. CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE (1949), and J. NOONAN, PERSONS 
AND MASKS OF THE LAW (1976). 
2. J. SHKLAR, LEGALISM (2d ed. 1986). 
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tinction introduced by Cicero in his Offices, describes as "passive in-
justice."3 "Active injustice" involves acts that depart from or fail to 
meet the specific requirements of the rules of justice. "Passive injus-
tice," in contrast, involves failure to "prevent or oppose wrong" when 
we have the power and occasion to do so. 4 
As citizens, we are passively unjust ... when we do not report crimes ... 
when we silently accept laws that we regard as unjust, unwise, or cruel 
... [w]hen we let the wife beater next door go to it rather than interfere, 
or when we close our eyes to a colleague who routinely grades randomly 
and arbitrarily out of sheer laziness . . . . [pp. 6, 43] 
As public officials, we are guilty of passive injustice when we evade 
responsibility for the disasters we could have foreseen or prevented 
and when we do not make full use of our powers and ability to prevent 
cruelty to those caught up in our systems of justice. 
Passive injustice, Shklar notes, is "a civic vice" (p. 42), by which 
she means that it is a vice that is most widely relevant in a self-gov-
erning community, because only in such a community do all citizens 
share, in however limited a way, in the power and responsibility to 
create a just order. Ordinary citizens do indeed possess such power, 
according to Shklar, because even mere proximity to wrongs can give 
us considerable power to prevent them (pp. 40-41). But the more 
power we possess, the more liable we become to complaints about pas-
sive injustice. Consequently, passive injustice is something that we are 
especially prone to discover in politicians, judges, bureaucrats, and 
other public officials who have been armed with the political commu-
nity's power to foresee and prevent harm. 
Judges who are so lazy that they pay no attention to the witnesses 
who come before them, immigration officials who are so unpleasant to 
their clients that they scare them away from their offices, politicians 
who are so blind and insensitive that they never consider the indirect 
harm to oppressed minorities caused by the inflammatory rhetoric 
they use to get elected - all are passively unjust. They all provoke a 
deep sense of injustice in their victims. We may not be able to do 
anything to correct their actions until they break some law or fail to 
follow an established procedure. But we do not wait until we discover 
some such crime or irregularity before we bristle at the injustice suf-
fered at their hands. 
The normal model of justice obscures this passive sense of injustice 
because it suggests that until a standard of justice has been violated, no 
injustice has occurred. Victims of what Shklar calls passive injustice 
can complain about the laziness, irresponsibility, negligence, stupidity, 
and incivility of the officials who torment them. But, according to the 
normal model, "[o]nly a victim whose complaints match the rule-gov-
3. CICERO, DE OFFICIIS 24-25 (W. Miller trans. 1956). 
4. Id. 
May 1991] The Victim's Voice 1337 
emed prohibitions has suffered an injustice. If there is no fit, it is only 
a matter of the victim's subjective reactions, a misfortune, and not 
really unjust" (p. 7). 
In this way, the normal model restricts claims of injustice to claims 
about the violation of the general rules and principles that should 
guide our behavior. In effect, the normal model tames, rather than 
defines, our often unruly sense of injustice. As such it may be very 
useful indeed within the institutions, such as courts, that we establish 
to tame and order our claims of injustice. But the model is far too 
narrow to encompass and explain the full range of complaints inspired 
by our sense of injustice. 
In order to gain a more accurate picture of the complexities of 
injustice, we need, Shklar suggests, to tum from philosophy and juris-
prudence to history, social psychology, and especially literature. For 
although philosophers devote most of their attention to virtues like 
justice, novelists and playwrights are much more at home with the 
vices. 5 Shklar, accordingly, makes many of her most important points 
through commentary on art and literature; characters from Dickens 
and Doctorow play as large a role in her discussion of injustice as 
philosophic propositions and case citations. Indeed, Shklar devotes 
her most extended and illuminating case commentary to a purely fic-
tional case: "the memorable trial of Bardell against Pickwick" that 
Dickens presents as the climax of his comic novel The Pickwick 
Papers. 6 
The rights and wrongs of this case, a breach of promise suit 
brought against Pickwick by his landlady, Mrs. Bardell, seem quite 
simple. Mrs. Bardell claims that Pickwick has treated her unjustly by 
breaking a promise to marry her. We readers know, however, that 
Mrs. Bardell has mistakenly jumped to the conclusion that such a 
promise was made. A second injustice, this time an actual rather than 
merely alleged departure from the rules of justice, occurs when Pick-
wick loses the suit and is thrown into prison when he refuses to pay 
the damages the court decrees. At first glance, the case seems to be 
easily accounted for by the normal model of justice and injustice. But 
when we look at the situation more closely, this simple, orderly picture 
quickly dissolves. Passive injustices lurk everywhere behind the al-
leged and actual violations of the explicit standards of justice raised in 
5. Shklar complains that because "philosophers refuse to think about injustice as deeply or as 
subtly as they do about justice ••. while history and fiction deal with little else," we are left with 
a "gap in our thinking" about political life and institutions. P. 16. She tries to close this gap in 
The Faces of Injustice, as in her earlier book Ordinary Vices, by using literary and historical 
evidence to revise philosophical models of political institutions and moral behavior. See J. 
SHKLAR, ORDINARY VICES (1984). 
6. c. DICKENS, THE PICKWICK PAPERS chs. 18, 20, 26, 34, 40-42 (Everyman's Library ed. 
1954) (1st ed. 1836). 
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the case. These passive injustices spur its participants to action and 
complicate our own evaluation of the situation. 
It is the arrogant and humiliating way in which Pickwick, certain 
of his superior power and position in life, dismisses the possibility of 
marriage to her that inspires Mrs. Bardell's suit, not just the imagined 
breach of promise. Similarly, the passively unjust behavior of Mrs. 
Bardell's lawyers - their willingness to let Pickwick be wronged by 
legal justice - provokes Pickwick's angry refusal to pay the damages 
imposed on him. Dodson and Fogg, Mrs. Bardell's lawyers, have 
taken the case "on spec" and pursue it with all their manipulative 
skills, despite full knowledge of its speciousness. (Pickwick is most 
upset about their gaining a share of the damages the court demands.) 
Like most lawyers, they believe that they serve justice by playing an 
adversarial role in the process that their community has established to 
determine whether its standards of justice have been violated. Because 
they play that role very well, neither they nor any participants in the 
case except Pickwick think them guilty of any injustice. Nevertheless, 
there can be little doubt that individuals, such as Mrs. Bardell's law-
yers, who play this role without any regard to the harm they allow to 
occur often provoke as deep a sense of indignation as those who di-
rectly violate established standards of justice. 
If we stick to the normal model of justice, we must settle for a 
rather impoverished understanding of the sense of injustice that drives 
the action in the celebrated case of Bardell v. Pickwick or, for that 
matter, in most everyday controversies. For the normal model blinds 
us to the myriad sources of injustice beside departures from recog-
nized standards of justice. Passive injustice, moreover, has no less se-
rious consequences than active injustice. As Shklar notes, if The 
Pickwick Papers were a Gothic rather than a comic novel, Pickwick's 
passive injustice would have led Mrs. Bardell to drive a stiletto into his 
back rather than drag him into court. And were that Gothic novel set 
in Corsica rather than England, a vicious blood feud would ensue, all 
as a result of an act of passive injustice. 
It may appear, however, that we are dealing here with a mere se-
mantic controversy: whether to use injustice or some other word to 
deplore the particular set of actions that Shklar insists on describing as 
passive injustice. After all, the proponents of the normal model of 
justice are not denying that these actions are reprehensible. Nor is 
Shklar suggesting that we punish the passively unjust in the same way 
that we regularly punish the actively unjust. The differences between 
them might seem to be merely a matter of emphasis and classification, 
rather than a moral or political disagreement. 
But the differences between the two models of injustice are not 
merely semantic. Indeed, one of the great virtues of Shklar's book is 
that it highlights the important moral and political consequences that 
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follow from supposedly inconsequential choices of emphasis and clas-
sification. The normal model of justice directs our attention toward 
the identification and justification of the primary rules and principles 
of justice and away from the exercise of power and complaints about 
passive injustice. The normal model recommends that we use terms 
other than injustice to support these complaints. But because injustice 
is in most places a word that claims the special concern of community 
members, such a recommendation considerably diminishes the ability 
of victims to claim our attention and interest {p. 5). Victims of the 
neglect, arrogance, and insensitivity of the powerful rarely have much 
more than their cries of injustice to gain our attention. In effect, the 
normal model of justice takes away from victims of passive injustice 
this means of attracting our attention and, in doing so, depoliticizes 
many of their complaints about their suffering. Its advocates advise 
those who perceive themselves as victims to focus their complaints on 
the violation of recognized standards of justice. But, as we have seen, 
the harm that inspires the indignation of victims does not always take 
the form of the violation of recognized rules and principles. And, per-
haps more important, the powerful always have far greater means to 
make and control arguments about established standards of justice. 
Although the normal models of justice and injustice usually origi-
nate in the studies of philosophers and jurists, the relatively powerful 
groups in any society usually define the way these models are realized 
in practice. Such groups, not surprisingly, have a strong interest in 
diminishing the importance of passive injustice, because the greater 
the attention paid to claims about passive injustice, the greater the 
demands that can be made on their resources and attention. Once we 
take this interest into consideration, it becomes clear that the normal 
model's restricted understanding of injustice not only fails to capture 
the full range of phenomena surrounding our sense of injustice, but 
that it also tends to reinforce the authority of the powerful and further 
disempower the potential victims of their arrogance, insensitivity, and 
indifference. 
II. INJUSTICE AND MISFORTUNE 
A defender of the normal model of justice might answer Shklar's 
critique by developing a new and improved version of the normal 
model of justice, a version that clearly spells out the nature and extent 
of social obligations to use power to prevent wrong. 7 But Shklar in-
sists that every attempt to improve the normal model in this way will 
be stymied by what she describes as the inherently limited, subjective, 
and political character of our knowledge of injustice. It is precisely 
7. Martha Nussbaum suggests this in her recent review of The Faces of Injustice in THE NEW 
REPUBLIC. Nussbaum, The Misfortune Teller (Book Review), NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 26, 1990, 
at 30, 32. 
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the normal model's assumption that we can discover determinate and 
adequate standards to measure our obligations to avoid injustice that 
Shklar challenges. 
That assumption, Shklar argues, is rooted in "the groundless belief 
that we can know and draw a stable and rigid distinction between the 
unjust and the unfortunate" (p. 9). We need to construct such distinc-
tions in order to separate naturally caused and unavoidable suffering 
from the suffering for which we hold each other accountable. Accord-
ingly, this distinction figures largely in moral philosophers' initial defi-
nitions of injustice. An unlucky roll of the dice is a misfortune, they 
tell us, while the use of loaded dice to produce poor rolling is an injus-
tice. 8 "Victims" have every right to express outrage at the latter, but 
not at the former. Unless we believe in an angry and omnipotent de-
ity, it is no more rational to wax indignant about our misfortunes than 
to smash the trash cans we trip over or blame messengers for the bad 
news they bring us. 
As long as the focus remains on active injustice, we have a fairly 
simple way of distinguishing injustice from misfortune: look for an ill-
intentioned, standard-violating agent. But once the focus turns to 
what Shklar calls passive injustice, the task becomes much more com-
plex. An earthquake is clearly a natural disaster and a misfortune for 
those who suffer from it. But it is also an injustice for its victims when 
much of their suffering could have been prevented or minimized by 
less complacent public officials - as these victims do not hesitate to 
say. How much suffering, we have to ask, should public officials be 
expected to prevent? Without an answer to this question, we cannot 
clearly distinguish between misfortune and injustice, but this question 
is far more difficult to answer than questions about the presence of ill-
intentioned violations of recognized standards. 
The reasons for this difficulty 
become clear enough when we recall that what is treated as unavoidable 
and natural, and what is regarded as contro.!lable and social, is often a 
matter of technology and of ideology or interpretation. The perceptions 
of victims and of those who, however remotely, might be victimizers, 
tend to be quite different. Neither the facts nor their meaning will be 
experienced in the same way by the afllicted as by mere observers or by 
those who might have averted or mitigated the suffering. These people 
are too far apart to see things in the same way. [p. 1] 
The distinction between injustice and misfortune, which seems so 
clear and simple in the books of moral philosophers, is quite uncertain 
and controversial in actual moral and political experience. If we were 
omniscient, we could be quite confident about the accuracy of our ef-
forts to distinguish between injustice and misfortune. For we would 
then be in a position to gather perfect knowledge about the effective 
8. See, e.g., J. LUCAS, ON JUSTICE 5-6 (1980). 
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means to prevent suffering that are available to us at any time and 
'place - knowledge that would be unclouded by our partial perspec-
tives as victims, observers, or public officials. Faced with a natural 
disaster such as an earthquake or flood, we could then state with confi-
dence exactly what we have a right to expect public officials to do in 
order to prevent or minimize the human suffering caused by these nat-
ural disasters and then, perhaps, we could come up with a rule or 
standard to which we could hold them. Officials who violate these 
standards of obligation would then be guilty of injustice. 
Lacking such omniscience, we are in no position to declare with 
any certainty exactly which harms we can prevent or minimize. Thus, 
we cannot delineate a standard, rule, or principle - the benchmarks 
of active justice and injustice - to guide our assessments of official 
action. Because we lack the omniscience needed to distinguish misfor-
tune from injustice, our judgments are always tentative and subject to 
revision in light of new information and perspectives: yesterday's mis-
fortunes become today's injustices when we discover, for example, that 
the limited capacities once confidently ascribed to natural distinctions 
such as race and gender are, in fact, imposed by the powerful on the 
weak. Yesterday's scientists were no less confident about their knowl-
edge of racial differentiation than we are about similarly controversial 
issues. In the face of such mistakes it is remarkable that so many theo-
rists continue to express confidence in our ability to distinguish natural 
misfortune from injustice. 
Shklar is not suggesting that we cease trying to identify naturally 
caused misfortunes and to use our knowledge to inform our judgments 
about justice and injustice. Her point is, instead, that even in the sim-
plest cases, we rarely have access to more than a very small part of the 
information needed to discover the actual boundaries between injus-
tice and misfortune: thus we cannot formulate rules of duty sufficient 
to cover the universe of possible events. We are merely fooling our-
selves, according to Shklar, when we treat our claims about misfortune 
and injustice as discoveries of fact. Instead, these claims represent 
political judgments about what we may expect and demand of each 
other and should be treated as such. 9 
Moreover, political judgments about ability and .responsibility to 
prevent suffering to others inevitably are colored by different perspec-
tives on events and the interests that these perspectives promote. In 
particular, those who suffer from a particular course of events and cir-
cumstances are much more likely to describe it as injustice than are 
9. See M. SMILEY, MORAL REsPONSIBILITY AND THE BOUNDARIES OF CoMMUNITY (1991), 
for a sustained and persuasive critique of our claims to factual discoveries of moral responsibility. 
Smiley also identifies the ways in which political considerations, such as ascriptions of communal 
membership and the distribution of power in society, shape judgments about any individual's 
responsibility for preventing or minimizing harm to others. 
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the besieged public officials against whom they often direct their 
complaints. 
Understandably, sufferers seek human or divine agents to blame 
for their suffering. As Shklar points out, it is intensely degrading to 
think of ourselves as mere victims of random and meaningless suffer-
ing (p. 5). In order to avoid such indignities, we will often even blame 
ourselves for our suffering rather than treat it as meaningless. As a 
result, those who suffer from unexpected harms will tend to see them-
selves as victims of injustice and search for agents who caused or at 
least could have prevented their suffering. 
In contrast, public officials and, in general, the more powerful 
members of any community have just as clear an interest in maximiz-
ing the range of events labeled as misfortune rather than injustice, 
since they cannot be held accountable for the suffering caused by una-
voidable misfortunes. "It could not be helped" is, accordingly, "the 
favorite evasion of passively unjust citizens" (p. 3). It is heard over 
and over again in the aftermath of any natural disaster, regardless of 
whether or not something could have been done to prevent or mini-
mize the suffering experienced by others. 
The normal model of justice, based as it is upon the example of 
adjudication, would suggest that we deal with these competing claims 
in the same way we deal with all other competing claims about justice 
and injustice: find an impartial third party to assess their accuracy. A 
neutral observer or "impartial spectator" would seem to be the best 
judge of whether a misfortune or injustice occurred or not, because he 
or she lacks the distorted perspective on events created by the victims' 
need to find someone to blame for their suffering and public officials' 
interest in getting themselves off the hook. 
Shklar emphatically rejects this suggestion. "[T]he self-under-
standing of victims must also be taken into account by a full theory of 
injustice ... [for] [v]ictimhood has an irreducibly subjective compo-
nent that the normal model of justice cannot easily absorb" (pp. 36-
37). No matter how much we strive to be impartial, no matter how 
concerned we are about improving the lot of the least advantaged, Sh-
klar argues that a large part of passive injustice always will be appar-
ent only to its victims. 
The reasons supporting her argument become clear when we re-
flect upon the relations between the powerful and the victims of their 
passive injustice. The significance that others find in our words and 
deeds tends to increase in proportion to the amount of power we have 
over their fate. What may seem to be a casual expression or an incon-
sequential indulgence can, and often does, have tremendous conse-
quences for the less powerful individuals affected by such an action. 
We can, of course, make an effort to be sensitive to the unintended 
consequences of seemingly inconsequential actions. But, given our 
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lack of omniscience, no one can recognize all of these consequences of 
her actions. Thus a whole range of harmful consequences will be ap-
parent only to those whom they victimize. We will learn about these 
harmful consequences only if we listen to the voices of the individuals 
who feel victimized by our words and actions. These individuals may 
frequently look for victimizers even when none exist; but they also 
have insights into the harmful consequences of public actions we can 
get from no other source. Shklar therefore concludes that in attempt-
ing to distinguish between injustice and misfortune, "[t]he voices of 
victims must always be heard first, not only to find out whether offi-
cially recognized social expectations have been denied, but also to at-
tend to their interpretations of the situation" (p. 81). 
While asking that we privilege the voices of victims in debates 
about distinguishing misfortune and injustice, Shklar fully recognizes 
that the public officials' perspective on these matters may also yield 
special insights that cannot be gained from a more distant perspective. 
But these insights, unlike those of the victim, are already widely, in-
deed, overly, represented in public judgments about misfortune and 
injustice. After all, the public officials' perspective on events domi-
nates legislation, administration, and public debate about allocation of 
scarce resources. By privileging the victim's perspective Shklar merely 
seeks to counterbalance the disproportionate weight that already is 
given to the public official's perspective in deciding what constitutes an 
injustice. 
Privileging the victim's perspective, however, may seem to violate 
the norms of impartiality that we tend to associate very closely with 
the idea of justice. But fidelity to established standards and impartial-
ity in applying them - virtues that serve legal justice very well -
remain virtues only so long as we possess relatively clear, determinate, 
and widely accepted standards to apply to particular situations.10 
Whenever we lack access to such standards, as we almost always do in 
our judgments about passive injustice and the justice of legislation, an 
emphasis upon the faithful and impartial application of whatever stan-
dards we do come up with tends to blind us to the political character 
10. Judges have access to such standards in the "easy cases" that comprise the great majority 
of the cases that come before them for decision. It is therefore appropriate to treat fidelity and 
impartiality as the principle virtues we ordinarily demand from judges. "Hard cases" - the 
cases that typically require higher levels of appellate court review - are those in which standards 
are absent, unclear, or controversial. The harder the case, the less valuable are the virtues of 
fidelity and impartiality. See Schauer, Judging in a Corner of the Law, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1717 
(1988). In the hard cases that occupy the attention of judges at the highest appellate courts, a 
reputation for fidelity and impartiality merely acts as a source of legitimation for a judge's exer-
cise of a partial and political judgment about the justice of different legislative standards. (I am 
not suggesting, however, that deciding easy cases does not represent an exercise of political 
power. But, unlike deciding hard cases, deciding easy cases involves an exercise of political 
power - the determination of the established interpretation of fairly clear, determinate and 
widely accepted standards - in which fidelity and impartiality are the most valued and relevant 
virtues.) 
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of the judgments we have made. Such an emphasis blinds us, in par-
ticular, to the ways in which we both privilege some voices and stifle 
others when making these judgments. 
Even well-intentioned efforts - such as Rawls' - to bring the 
position of the least advantaged into our thinking about justice tend to 
silence the "irreducibly subjective" voices of victims (p. 37). Rawls, as 
is well-known, insists that we derive our principles of justice by asking 
ourselves what standards would be chosen by genuinely fair and im-
partial individuals, individuals whose impartiality is guaranteed by a 
"veil of ignorance" that obscures their knowledge of their own partic-
ular situation.11 In doing so, however, he unintentionally privileges 
the subjective perspective of relatively powerful individuals. For 
Rawls asks us to make our choice of principles of justice from a partic-
ular perspective, a perspective that fits much better with the partial 
experience of public officials and other powerful individuals in society 
than with that of those who perceive themselves victims of injustice: 
the perspective of individuals legislating for their entire community. 
These individuals are allowed in their deliberation to imagine how 
they might react were they to become the victims of society's stan-
dards of justice, but not to draw upon their own partial and subjective 
experiences of victimization (if they have such experiences to draw 
upon). As a result, the perspective that defines Rawls' principles of 
justice, principles that, among other things, aim at improving the con-
dition of the least advantaged groups in society, necessarily excludes 
the subjective, but otherwise unattainable insights of victimized groups 
into the injustice of laws and social institutions.12 
The normal model's effort to bring all of injustice into a model of 
determinate standards of justice reflects what Shklar characterized in 
an earlier book as a "legalist" understanding of political morality. 13 
Legalism, according to Shklar, is a set of ideas and general attitudes 
that leads us to believe that moral and political judgments are best 
made when, like legal judgments, they represent the application of 
general rules and principles to particular cases.14 In this broad sense, 
the normal model's understanding of justice and injustice is legalistic. 
Just individuals, according to this model, have the virtues of good ad-
judicators: they faithfully and impartially apply the normal model's 
rules and principles to particular situations. Unjust individuals, in 
contrast, break faith with the primary standards of justice. 15 In order 
11. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971). 
12. I make a similar argument in Yack, The Problem with Kantian Liberalism, in KANT'S 
PoLmcs (R. Beiner & W. Booth eds.) (forthcoming). 
13. See generally J. SHKLAR, supra note 2. 
14. Id. at vii-x, 1-28. 
15. Even utilitarian and other consequentialist versions of the normal model are often legalis-
tic in this sense, even though they insist that rules of justice should bend according to the require-
ments of the greatest good. For they still model political judgment on adjudication, suggesting 
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to maintain this legalist approach to political morality, one has to as-
sume, as do all proponents of normal models of justice, that we can 
identify the determinate rules and principles that allow us to recognize 
an injustice when it occurs. 
As we have seen, Shklar complains about both the unrealistic 
pretensions to knowledge packed into this assumption and the dis-
empowering effect that this assumption has upon the victims of injus-
tice. When we turn, like Michael Walzer, to the supposedly shared 
social meanings of goods as a guide to the basic rules and principles of 
justice, 16 we are bound, Shklar argues, to exaggerate the degree of so-
cial agreement about goods and to place disproportionate emphasis on 
the viewpoints of the more powerful groups in any community.17 
When we tum, like John Rawls, to hypothetical constructions of fair 
and impartial reasoning for our basic principles of justice, we blind 
ourselves to the important insights that can come only from partial 
perspectives on injustice.18 As long as we continue to take a legalist 
approach to the identification of extralegal standards of justice, we will 
continue to disempower victims of injustice and to pretend to cogni-
tive capacities we do not possess. 
In the end, Shklar offers a much more modest and political model 
of justice and injustice in place of the legalism of the normal model. 
She suggests that questions about the justice and injustice of laws and 
official actions can only have political answers, answers that reflect a 
range of partial and competing perspectives on disputed questions. 
The search for extralegal standards of justice against which to adjudi-
cate these competing claims reflects a vain and self-deluding effort to 
remake political judgment in the image of legal judgment. If, like so-
cial democrats such as Rawls and Walzer, we believe in the equal 
moral worth of individuals, then, Shklar concludes, our task is to find 
ways of empowering the voices of previously silent victims, rather than 
to search in vain for some body of rules and principles that will fully 
capture our sense of human dignity. 
that the best political judgments are those that represent the application of a preceding, shared, 
and well-established principle - such as "seek the greatest good of the greatest number'' - to 
particular situations. 
16. See M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 3-30 (1983). 
17. Commenting on Walzer's argument about the shared social meaning against which we 
measure our judgments about justice, Shklar complains that 
[t]hese intimations of shared meaning, as divined by prophetic or traditionalist avatars of the 
spirit of the people, are never checked against actual opinions, least of all those of the most 
disadvantaged and frightened people .... In the absence of a clear and free account of their 
feelings, we should assume that the least advantaged members of a society resent their situa-
tion, even though - like many a black slave - they smile and sing in a show of 
contentment. 
P. 115. 
18. Shklar does not explicitly criticize Rawls in this way, but, as we have seen, her arguments 
do seem to have direct critical implications for his theory of ·~ustice as fairness." 
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Ill. REVISING THE NORMAL MODEL OF JUSTICE 
The arguments discussed in the preceding Parts notwithstanding, 
Shklar explicitly disclaims any interest or intention in challenging the 
normal model's conception of justice, as opposed to its "complacent 
view of injustice" {p. 18). "I do not wish," she adds, "to suggest that 
there is something absurd about the normal model's construction of 
justice .... I do not propose to challenge it or to reject the legal values 
that it promotes" {p. 18). 
Given the severity of Shklar's critique of the normal model's con-
struction of injustice, these disclaimers may seem a little disingenuous. 
Surely, her critique of legalism in thinking about injustice has numer-
ous implications for the way we think about justice. I already have 
explored one important implication of her arguments for theories of 
justice: the inadequacy of the legalist virtues of fidelity and impartial-
ity as guides to extralegal standards of justice.19 Shklar's analysis of 
injustice suggests that the normal model goes wrong because it inap-
propriately applies a legalist or adjudicatory model of judgment to de-
cisions about how to distinguish an act of passive injustice from a 
misfortune. If we need to go beyond the normal model to identify and 
avoid passive injustice, then we clearly need to go beyond it in order to 
figure out how to act justly. 
Shklar's reluctance to challenge the normal model's construction 
of justice seems to stem from her fear that doing so will impugn "the 
legal values" associated with court-centered justice and the rule of law. 
"Without juridical institutions and the beliefs that support them, there 
can be no decent, just, or stable social relations, but only anxiety, mu-
tual mistrust, and insecurity" {p. 18). Shklar in no way seeks to sup-
plant the application of established general rules and principles to 
particular cases as the dominant model for the discovery of legal obli-
gation in courts. She is merely trying to alert us to what this model 
omits, as a guide to the entire subject of justice and injustice. In this 
way, she seeks to undermine the normal model's "confidence in the 
ability of the institutions that it underwrites really to cope with iniq-
uity" {p. 18). As noted earlier, the normal model and the rule of law 
provide a means of taming injustice, of diminishing "the anxiety, mu-
tual mistrust, and insecurity" {p. 18) expressed and contributed to by 
our sense of injustice. Shklar merely wants to remind us that no sys-
tem of legal institutions can ever completely satisfy our sense of injus-
tice, and that legal judgment inevitably provokes someone's sense of 
injustice, even as it tames many others'. We may choose a legalist 
approach as the best way of exercising coercive power, she tells us, as 
long as we do not delude ourselves into thinking that by doing so we 
will ever identify and eliminate more than a small part of injustice. 
19. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
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Shklar seems to think that challenging the normal model's under-
standing of justice endangers rule of law values in a way that challeng-
ing its understanding of injustice does not. I disagree with her on this 
point. The critique of the normal model of justice implied by Shklar's 
analysis of injustice merely brings into question the kind of dogmatic 
legalistic defenses of the rule of law that she has already severely criti-
cized in Legalism. 20 In any case, I do not believe that she can chal-
lenge the normal model's understanding of injustice without implicitly 
challenging its understanding of justice. 
Shklar implicitly relies on two different concepts of justice in The 
Faces of Injustice. These two concepts of justice correspond directly to 
the two concepts of injustice, passive and active, upon which she ex-
plicitly relies. Corresponding to active injustice, that is, to the injus-
tice that comprises all departures from established standards, is the 
normal model's familiar concept of justice as fidelity to these standards 
and impartiality in applying them. I shall call this familiar "normal" 
concept of justice passive justice, because it merely requires that we 
coordinate our actions with established standards of justice. Corre-
sponding to passive injustice, however, is a much less familiar concept 
of justice that I shall call active justice. Since passive injustice refers to 
our failure to prevent the wrongs we are in a position to prevent, active 
justice refers to the actions of individuals who properly use their power 
and ability to prevent wrongs to their fellow citizens. 
Active injustice is nothing but the violation of the rules and princi-
ples of what I have called passive justice. But passive injustice cannot 
similarly be defined as a mere departure from what I have called active 
justice. For no clear, determinate, and widely accepted standards, 
such as those that define passive justice, define active justice. As we 
have seen in the preceding Part, there can be no simple factual answer 
to questions about what constitutes the just use of power to prevent 
the suffering of others. Answers to these questions are always political 
rather than factual judgments. These judgments inevitably reflect the 
strength and intensity of the claims and counterclaims made by those 
who seek to blame someone for their suffering and those who seek to 
evade responsibility. Unlike the passive justice of the normal model, 
active justice does not simply lay out standards against which to mea-
sure claims about injustice. It is and should be defined, to a great 
extent, with reference to competing claims about injustice. 
Justice, Shklar and other theorists have suggested, is a rather im-
personal virtue that rarely inspires any enthusiasm. As Shklar points 
out in her subtle and insightful commentaries on Giotto's depictions of 
justice and injustice in the Cappella degli Scrovegni in Padua, typical 
20. J. SHKLAR, supra note 2, at 111-209; see also Shklar, Political Theory and the Rule of 
Law, in THE RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY 1-10 (A. Hutchinson & P. Monahan eds. 
1987). 
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representations of justice show her steadfast and impassive, but hardly 
lovable (pp. 46-49, 102-04). "[J]ustice,'' J.R. Lucas notes, "is a cold 
virtue which can be manifested without feeling .... [I]t is when injus-
tice is in danger of being done that we become agitated."21 
Shklar and Lucas, however, come to this conclusion only because 
they focus exclusively on what I have called passive justice, which, as 
we have seen, consists of the virtues of fidelity to standards and impar-
tiality in applying them. These are cold virtues, indeed. But active 
justice, which encompasses a much broader range of virtues, certainly 
inspires our imagination and enthusiasm. The justice that we expect 
from great legislators, judges, administrators, or anyone else who 
makes good use of her power, is neither blind nor impassive. It is a 
justice that looks straight into the faces of those who suffer, rather 
than staring steadfastly at a distant body of impersonal rules. It is 
something we look for in anyone who has the power to affect the 
course of our lives. Because it requires the exercise of much greater 
abilities and sensitivity than passive justice, we are inclined to cele-
brate it when we find it. 
Active justice, accordingly, excites our warmest admiration.22 
This kind of justice, the disposition to prevent harm to one's fellow 
citizens, and not, as Rawls would have it, a disposition to fairness, 
represents "the first virtue of social institutions."23 We are, contrary 
to Rawls, quite willing to sacrifice the fairness of social institutions to 
a whole variety of competing ends, from security and individual free-
dom to civil peace and mental tranquility, and it is values such as these 
that active justice preserves and promotes. If any form of justice is to 
represent the sine qua non of social institutions, then, it could only be 
something like what I have described as active justice, the disposition 
to protect fellow citizens from harm. Shklar's complaints about the 
limitations of the normal model of justice encourage us to begin to 
think about this other, more political concept of justice, even if she 
does not explicitly explore it.24 
It is appropriate that I end this review essay by discussing implica-
21. J. LUCAS, supra note 8, at 4. 
22. Active justice, however, has a counterfeit image that has inspired equal enthusiasm in 
this century: a charismatic leader's claim to embody the spirit of a community and to possess a 
special, instinctive understanding of what is best for its members. The fanatical devotion that 
such claims have inspired may be one reason for Shklar's reluctance to discuss the nature and 
implications of active justice. 
23. J. RAWLS, supra note 11, at 3. 
24. In the fifth chapter of my forthcoming book on Aristotelian political philosophy, The 
Problems of a Political Animal, I argue that Aristotle's concept of "universal justice" corresponds 
to what I have described as "active justice." Aristotle contrasts universal justice with "particular 
justice" or fairness, which, like what I have described as "passive justice," focuses on fidelity to 
determinate standards. Universal justice, rather than fairness, inspires the poets to sing of justice 
that "neither evening nor morning star is such a wonder." ARISTOTLE, N1coMACHEAN ETHICS 
1129-b (quoting Euripides). 
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tions of Shklar's ideas that go well beyond her explicit arguments. For 
The Faces of Injustice is just as valuable for the new questions it forces 
us to ask ourselves as for the insightful arguments it explicitly 
presents. Other analyses of justice and injustice may present much 
more systematic arguments, but very few of them give us as much to 
think about as does The Faces of Injustice. 
